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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
pany to its policy holders. Such dividends are not taxed as
ordinary income, but rather reduce the taxpayer's investment in
the policy.30 The effect of this special treatment would seem to
encourage the furnishing of venture capital to insurance com-
panies for reinvestment by them, for an insurance company will
have greater freedom to reinvest premiums when it is not obli-
gated to pay a fixed return to its policy holders. Therefore, the
special treatment of insurance company dividends appears to be
in accord with the major purpose of the capital gains provisions,
which is to encourage the free flow of investment capital.31
Thus it would seem that a gain on the sale of an annuity or an
endowment policy prior to its maturity should be accorded cap-
ital gains treatment where the policy holder has furnished the
insurance company with venture capital. The mere fact that a
particular policy is an endowment or an annuity should not be
controlling in itself. In Phillips, taxpayer purchased term life
insurance of a stipulated amount plus a promise to pay a fixed
future sum, the net cost of these rights being determined by the
company's profits. It seems that his purchase is like an in-
vestment in the insurance company, and that his position is
analogous to that of an owner. But in Arnfeld the amount of
cash surrender value and term insurance, and the sum to be
applied to the future annuity all depended upon the fixed rate
of return on the deposit made under the contract. The purchaser
of this type of contract is in a position similar to that of a credi-
tor of the insurance company, for the gain on disposal of his
policy is a realization of an accrued return allowed for the use
of money deposited with the company. Thus it seems that the
instant cases are distinguishable, and that the decision in each
is sound.32
Charles B. Sklar
MINERAL RIGHTS -IMPROPER PAYMENT OF DELAY RENTALS -
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE -ASSUMPTION OF VENDOR'S
OBLIGATIONS BY VENDEE
Landowner, owning only one-fourth of the minerals, executed
a mineral lease to defendants' predecessor in title. Although
30. See note 28 supra.
31. S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 50 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1567,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938) ; H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1942).
32. However, since life insurance and annuity contracts have been held to be in
the same class as bonds, it could be argued that a contrary result could have been
reached in the Arnfeld case. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
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the lease was not expressly limited to cover only a one-fourth
interest, delay rentals were paid on that basis, and the lessor
agreed in a special clause that any additional interests there-
after acquired in the leased premises would be subject to the
lease. It was also specially agreed that all conditions in the lease
would bind the parties' successors or assigns. Landowner sold
the property and his one-fourth mineral interest to plaintiff.
Believing that the original lease had expired due to improper
payment of delay rentals, plaintiff granted a second lease to a
third person on the entire mineral interest, and production was
obtained. Defendant had timely deposited a delay rental pro-
portionate to plaintiff's increased mineral ownership subsequent
to the prescriptive return of the outstanding three-fourths in-
terest to the land. Six months later, after granting the second
lease, plaintiff refused the deposit. Plaintiff brought suit for a
declaratory judgment upholding this second lease as to the en-
tirety of the minerals. Defendant claimed that the first lease
was in force not only as to one-fourth of the minerals, but also
as to the other three-fourths because of the doctrine of after-
acquired title and the additional interest clause of the lease con-
tract. The district court held that defendant's lease was valid
as to the one-fourth mineral interest owned by the lessor at the
time the lease was granted and plaintiff's lease was valid as to
the remaining three-fourths of the minerals. On appeal, held,
affirmed. Plaintiff would not be heard to say that the delay
rentals on defendant's lease were improperly paid because of
plaintiff's delay in rejecting the payment. The doctrine of after-
acquired title was not applicable because defendant's lessor had
not purported to lease more than he owned. The original lessor's
obligation to lease any additional interests he might acquire was
a personal obligation not binding upon a subsequent purchaser
of the land. Calhoun v. Gulf Refining Co., 235 La. 494, 104 So.2d
547 (1958).
This case presents three distinct problems. The first of these
is the forfeiture of leases for improper payment of delay rentals.
There is a very strict obligation to make such payments to the
proper party within the stipulated time and without under-
payment in order to avoid forfeiture of a lease.' However, a
lessor will not be heard to complain of late payment of a delay
1. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 46 So.2d 907 (1950)
(payment to the wrong person made on the basis of the public records forfeited
the lease) ; LeRosen v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442
(1930) (depositing payment to the joint account of the lessor and his wife for-
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rental where he had accepted the paymeit when offered and
allowed the lessee to develop.2 The court has also refused to
declare a lease forfeited where the amount of the payment was
delivered to Western Union on the day specified and transmitted
the next day.3 When there is a mutual mistake as to the amount
due, the lessee must be informed of the mistake and allowed to
pay the amount due.4
In the instant case, plaintiff was estopped by the delay of
six months to assert that an overpayment had forfeited defend-
ant's lease. If defendant had been given early notice, he might
have tendered the proper sum.5 It is questionable if overpayment
would have been held to forfeit the lease even if the court had
found no estoppel.6
The second problem raised in this case concerned defendant's
unsuccessful contention that his lease included the entirety of
the mineral rights under the doctrine of after-acquired title.
This doctrine is not expressly stated in the Civil Code, but was
judicially derived as a means of enforcing the warranty against
eviction from the thing sold.7 When a person purports to sell
property he does not own and later acquires valid title, that
title inures to the benefit of his vendee. Although the doctrine
was first applied in cases involving the sale of corporeal prop-
erty,s it has since been extended to cover the sale of a greater
feited the lease) ; Dickerson v. Texana Oil and Refining Co., 147 La. 341, 84 So.
896 (1920) ; Rowe v. Atlas Oil Co., 147 La. 37, 84 So. 485 (1920) ; Jennings-
Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere Latreille Oil Co., 119 La. 793, 44 So. 481
(1907).
2. Dellinger v. Smith, 142 La. 1009, 77 So. 947 (1918).
3. Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So.2d 598 (1952).
4. Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So.2d 34 (1948).
5. It seems that the court's finding of an estoppel is correct. One may be
estopped by his silence if he had a duty to speak and if another acts or fails to
act because of that silence. E. C. Taylor Co. v. New York and Cuba Mail S.S.
Co., 159 La. 381, 105 So.379 (1925). One cannot stand by silently and allow
himself to be damaged when by his acts or words he could have prevented the
damage. Swain v. Louisiana Light and Power Co., 128 So. 538 (La. App. 1930).
6. However, there would seem to be some merit to the contention that such an
overpayment would cause injury since the amount was increased in proportion to
plaintiff's increased mineral interest. Payment on that basis would seem to in-
dicate that the parties considered the newly acquired minerals as subject to the
lease.
7. White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942) ; Brewer v. New Orleans
Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So. 605 (1923); Wolf v. Carter, 131 La. 667, 60 So.
52 (1912) ; New Orleans v. Riddell, 113 La. 1051, 37 So. 966 '(1905) ; Lee v.
Ferguson, 5 La. Ann. 532 (1850) ; Stokes v. Shackleford, 12 La. 170 (1838)
Feen v. Rils, 9 La. 95 (1836) ; Woods v. Kimbal, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 246 (La. 1826)
McGuire v. Amelung, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 649 (La. 1823); Bonin v. Eyssaline, 12
Mart.(O.S.) 185 (La. 1822). See Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REviaW 312
(1958).
8. Bonin v. Eyssaline, 12 Mart.(O.$.) -185 .(La. 1822). The court relied on a
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mineral interest than was actually owned9 as well as conven-
tional and mineral leases.10 The doctrine, as generally stated,
comes into play only when the vendor (or lessor) himself ac-
quires valid title to the property he purported to sell (or lease).
However, it has been applied to cases where the vendor died, and
his heirs, who were personally liable for their ancestor's obliga-
tions, later acquired valid title." The application of the doctrine
in the field of mineral rights raised the question of whether the
purchaser of land from one who had granted a mineral servitude
or lease might be bound by his vendor's warranties in a previous
agreement of lease or sale. There appears to be only one case in
which this problem was considered. 12  The landowner's vendee
was declared to be the owner of the minerals when the outstand-
ing mineral servitude prescribed. The rationale of the court's
holding was that public policy would not permit an outstanding
mineral interest for a period greater than ten years.' The court
indicated by way of dictum that the after-acquired title doctrine
would have been applicable had the owner not sold the land. It
principle stated in LeClercq's work on Roman law. 5 LECLERCQ, Daorr ROMAIN
279.
9. Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La. 479, 59 So.2d 693 (1952) ; McDonald v. Richard,
203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943) ; White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433
(1942).
The doctrine has been held inapplicable, however, to sales of minerals by the
landowner who does not own them to the real mineral owner because of the public
policy against having minerals outstanding for longer than ten years in the absence
of interruption of prescription. Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger, 222 La. 670,
63 So.2d 420 (1952).
See Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 312 (1958), where it was argued
that the public policy would not be violated by its application to such a transac-
tion since the landowner could accomplish the same thing by acknowledgment.
10. The same reasons for the rule in sales cases are present here, because the
lessor warrants the lessee against eviction from the thing leased. Jackson v. United
Gas Public Service Co., 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940) ; Gayosa Co. v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677 (1933) ; St. Landry Oil and Gas Co.
v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928).
11. White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942) ; Stokes v. Shackleford,
12 La. 170 (1838). In both of these cases the heir acquired his interest in the
property by inheritance from the vendor. The basis for this holding is the fact
that heirs accepting unconditionally are liable for all the obligations of the de-
cedent. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1056 (1870). Even if the heir accepts with bene-
fit of inventory he is liable for the obligations of the deceased up to the. amount
of the assets. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1032 (1870).
12. McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943). In this case the
landowner sold a greater mineral interest than he owned, and subsequently sold
the land to a third party. When the outstanding mineral servitude prescribed, the
purchaser of the minerals claimed ownership, contending that there had been a
valid sale of a reversionary interest.
13. Language in this case indicated that there could be a sale of a "reversionary
interest" under some circumstances. The case. of HEcks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72
So.2d 322 (1954) finally settled that issue in holding that any sale of a reversion-
ary interest would offend the public policy against having mineral rights outstand-
ing for longer than ten years in the absence of interruption of prescription.
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has been assumed by one writer that the doctrine would not
apply to mineral leases where the lessor had sold the land before
the minerals reverted, 14 but there appear to be no cases on this
point.
In the instant case, defendant contended that when the out-
standing servitude on three-fourths of the minerals prescribed,
those minerals became included in its lease by the doctrine of
after-acquired title although the original lessor no longer owned
the land. It was argued that Article 201515 supports this propo-
sition since it provides that servitudes and leases are real obli-
gations which accompany the land into the hands of whoever
acquires it. The court held the doctrine inapplicable on the
grounds that defendant's lessor did not purport to lease all of
the minerals. The inclusion of a clause in the lease to the effect
that the lessor would lease any additional mineral rights he ac-
quired in the land indicated that there were outstanding min-
erals. Although not given as a reason for the court's holding,
the amount paid as delay rentals showed that the parties regard-
ed the lease as including only one-fourth of the minerals.'6 It
was not necessary for the court to consider defendant's conten-
tion that the doctrine of after-acquired title would apply where
the original lessor had sold the land prior to the time that the
mineral servitude prescribed.
The final problem raised in this case concerned the effect of
the clause requiring the lessor to include in the lease any addi-
tional mineral rights in the land which he might thereafter ac-
quire, and purporting to bind his successors and assigns. Such a
clause has been commonly found in leases for some time, but this
is the first Louisiana Supreme Court case interpreting it. 17 The
court indicated that such a clause would be binding on the orig-
14. Comment, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 312, 319 (1958).
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2015 (1870): "Not only servitudes, but leases and
all other rights, which the owner had imposed on his land before the alienation of
the soil, form real obligations which accompany it in the hands of the person who
acquires it, although he have made no stipulation on the subject, or they be not
mentioned in the act of transfer." Since the after-acquired title doctrine was held
to be inapplicable, the court did not decide on the merits of defendant's argument.
Article 2015 was also cited by defendant in reference to the additional interest
contract clause. For the court's ruling on this argument, see page 543 infra. It
appears a similar conclusion would have been reached here had the court decided
this issue.
16. Rentals were set at one dollar per acre of minerals. The lease covered
298.19 acres. Delay rentals were paid to the original lessor at $74.55 or one-
fourth of the rental payable on the whole tract.
17. A federal district court applying Louisiana law held a similar clause bind-
ing on the lessor and his heir. Dees v. Hunt Oil Co., 123 F. Supp. 58 (W. D. La.
1954).
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inal lessor, since it imposes only a conditional obligation depend-
ent upon the happening of an uncertain event.'8 The clause also
presents the question of whether the obligation, if binding on
the original lessor of the land, is also binding on the purchaser
of the land. It was argued in the instant case that Civil Code
Article 201519 would cause subsequent purchasers of the land to
be bound by the clause. Several cases interpreting this article
contain language to the effect that the vendee assumes all of
the vendor's obligations under a prior lease agreement, but such
statements were not essential to the holdings.2 0  On the other
hand, it has been squarely held that the vendee does not assume
all of the lessor's obligations under the lease, but merely takes
the land subject to the lease.2 1 This latter holding seems to be
the proper interpretation. On its face Article 2015 seems to
refer only to servitudes and leases which the owner has placed
upon the land and not to any incidental obligations which he may
have assumed.
Defendant contended that the outstanding three-fourths min-
eral interest became included in its lease by virtue of this lease
provision and Article 2015. The court held that the clause estab-
lished an obligation depending on the acquisition of additional
mineral interests in the land by the. original lessor during the
existence of the lease and fell when the situation did not ma-
terialize. The implication is that had the original lessor con-
tinued to own the land, he would have been bound by the lease
provision, but the plaintiff by purchasing the land subject to
the lease did not assume the lessor's obligation under the clause.
A mineral lease is not a jus in re but is rather a jus ad rem, a
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2021 (1870) : "Conditional obligations are such as are
made to depend on an uncertain event. If the obligation is not to take effect until
the event happen, it is a suspensive condition; if the obligation takes effect im-
mediately, but is liable to be defeated when the event happens, it is then a resolu-
tory condition."
Id. art. 2043: "The obligation contracted on a suspensive condition, is that
which depends, either on a future and uncertain event, or on an event which has
actually taken place, without its being yet known to the parties.
"In the former case, the obligation can not be executed till after the event;
in the latter, the obligation has its effect from the day on which it was contracted,
but it can not be enforced until the event be known."
19. See note 15 supra.
20. Houssiere Latreille Oil Co. v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 115 La.
107, 38 So. 932 (1905) (all that was at issue was whether the land was still sub-
ject to a prior lease) ; Walker v. Vanwinkle, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 560 (La. 1830) (all
that was at issue was whether the vendee could exercise the rights of a lessor
under the statutory eviction procedure).
21. Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Levy, 191 So. 747 (La. App. 1939). The lessor
had agreed to pay a commission to the broker in the event the lessee exercised his
option to renew the lease. The lessor sold the property and the lessee later renewed.
The purchaser of the property was not required to pay the commission.
1959]
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right upon thing. The court's meaning in the use of this term
is shown by its opinion in Reagan v. Murphy22 where it was held
that a mineral lease creates only personal rights. Defendant's
right to after-acquired minerals being personal against the lessor
could not be asserted against the plaintiff, the new landowner.
The court found nothing in Civil Code Article 2015 which im-
posed such an obligation on the vendor.
In summary, the instant case indicates that there is a duty
on the part of a mineral lessor to inform the lessee within a
reasonable time of an error in payment of delay rentals even
where that error is unilateral on the part of the lessee. It shows
that the doctrine of after-acquired title will not be applied where
the language of the contract or the surrounding circumstances
show that the lessee has already received everything for which
he bargained. It indicates that lease clauses binding the lessor
and his successors to include future-acquired minerals in the
lease will be given effect as between the parties to the lease, but
squarely holds that they have no effect on future purchasers of
the land.
William M. Nolen
MUNICIPAL ZONING ORDINANCES - LAX ENFORCEMENT A BAR TO
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The City of New Orleans, seeking removal of artifices in
violation of an ordinance passed for the preservation of the
"architectural and historical value"' of the Vieux Carr6 in New
Orleans, sought a mandatory injunction against the defendant
restaurant owner, who had previously been fined for the same
violation.2 The city had made no attempt to enjoin others for
similar violations. In addition, some violators were fined while
still others went totally unmolested.8 The lower court issued the
injunction. On rehearing on appeal the Supreme Court held,
reversed. Failure of the city to prosecute others did not deny
equal protection of the law under the Federal Constitution be-
22. 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (La. 1958), 19 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 207.
1. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 22A, implemented in New Orleans City Code, §§ 1-6
(1956). See also New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So.2d 559 (1941)
(legislation held constitutional).
2. New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So.2d 798 (1953).
3. The city had not attempted to enjoin other violators of the zoning ordinance,
and, in addition, permits had been issued to others in the zoned area, which per-
mits allowed construction of artifices which otherwise would have violated the
ordinance. Defendant had been denied such a permit.
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